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In February, 1991, Roberta and Jan DeBoer took home a
much-wanted baby, Jessica, from Iowa to Michigan. The birth
mother, Cara Clausen, together with the man she named on the
birth certificate, had given the DeBoers permission to adopt Jessica.1 But several weeks later, Ms. Clausen notified Daniel
Schmidt, the actual biological father of her child, that Jessica had
been born. Ms. Clausen and Mr. Schmidt then sought to bring Jessica (whom they named Anna) back home to Iowa with them.
The resulting legal battle lasted over two years. The case was
litigated in the courts of both Michigan and Iowa, consumed
countless legal fees, and caused emotional trauma to the DeBoers,
Ms. Clausen and Mr. Schmidt, and, of course, to Jessica. The case
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I Jessica was born on February 8, 1991, and Ms. Clausen signed a form releasing custody of her daughter two days later. On February 14, Scott Seefeldt, the man named as the
father, released his custody rights. A court terminated the parental rights of Ms. Clausen
and Mr. Seefeldt on February 25, granting the DeBoers custody of the baby for the duration
of the adoption proceedings. In re Clausen, 442 Mich 648, 502 NW2d 649, 652 (1993). For a
summary of the chronology and details of the DeBoer/Clausen case, see Lucinda Franks,
The War for Baby Clausen, The New Yorker 56 (Mar 22, 1993).
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made the covers of both People and Time in the same week, 2 and
was the subject of much other media coverage. While the courts
occasionally considered Jessica's best interests,' they ultimately
held in favor of the biological parents, Ms. Clausen and Mr.
Schmidt, without explicitly applying the best interests of the child
standard.4
The best interests of the child standard is, of course, the one
used by virtually all American states to determine custody between
two biological parents.5 When it comes to adoption, however, the
standard has traditionally been very different, focusing on parental
unfitness or relinquishment rather than on the child's needs. Indeed, the Iowa Supreme Court held that the rights of the parent
and the child conflict only upon a showing of parental unfitness;6
the Michigan Supreme Court presented the custody rights of the
biological family as "intrinsic human rights."'
The DeBoer-Clausen-Schmidt case presents a dramatic conflict between the best interests of a child, the rights of her biological parents, and the rights of her would-be adoptive parents. Although the legal system has chosen biology (without consideration
of the best interests of the child), Professor Elizabeth Bartholet of
Harvard Law School would argue that this is the wrong decision.'
In Family Bonds: Adoption and the Politics of Parenting,
Professor Bartholet explores our cultural assumptions about bio-

2

Bill Hewitt, Losing Jessi, People 48 (July 19, 1993); Nancy Gibbs, In Whose Best

Interest?, Time 44 (July 19, 1993).
3 The lower courts did consider the best interests of the child. See In the Matter of
Baby Girl Clausen, 199 Mich App 10, 501 NW2d 193, 196 (1993). See also the account of the
decision of the Circuit Court of Washtenaw County, Michigan, in Franks, War for Baby
Clausen at 69.
4 The Iowa Supreme Court held that the best interests of the child are not implicated
unless parental rights have been terminated. In Interest of B.G.C., 496 NW2d 239, 245
(Iowa 1992). Because Mr. Schmidt's rights had never been terminated, Jessica's best interests were simply not relevant. It is not clear whether applying a best interests of the child
standard would have changed the ultimate outcome of the case.
While the case continued, Ms. Clausen married Mr. Schmidt, and they had another
child. Franks, War for Baby Clausen at 67.
5 Jana B. Singer and William L. Reynolds, A Dissent on Joint Custody, 7 Md L Rev
497, 519 (1988).
6 In Interest of B.G.C., 496 NW2d at 245.
In re Clausen, 502 NW2d at 651, citing Smith u Organizationof FosterFamilies, 431
US 816, 845-46 (1977).
8 See Brief of Concerned Academics as Amici Curiae in Support of Application for Stay
Filed on Behalf of Petitioner Jessica DeBoer, DeBoer v DeBoer, 114 S Ct 11 (1993) (arguing
for the consideration of the child's interests) (Professor Bartholet signed onto the brief as
an amicus); Elizabeth Bartholet, Blood Parents vs. Real Parents, NY Times A19 (July 13,
1993).
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logical family relationships and adoption. She questions the emphasis on the autonomy of biological parents and the resulting definitions and applications of the best interests of the child standard.
Instead, she suggests a broader approach which also accounts for
the child's nurturing relationships.9 Throughout the book, she interweaves her personal experiences as both an adoptive and a biological mother with an analysis of the legal system's approach to
parenting. Perhaps because of her background as a civil rights attorney, Professor Bartholet is particularly sensitive to issues concerning discrimination against adoption.
At times, however, her book takes a simplified and somewhat
misleading approach, which, because it is based on her own experiences, ignores variations, including those based on race and class.
For example, in her discussion of adoptions occurring outside the
public agency context, such as where adoptive parents contact the
birth mother directly, Bartholet discusses the experiences of those
with sufficient money to buy their way out of the system (pp 7374). Her description gives the illusion that parents using private
adoption can avoid all but "minimal screening" (p 73); in fact, the
level and intrusiveness of screening varies widely from state to
state.' 0 Similarly, Professor Bartholet's focus on. certain- types of
adoption generally overlooks the many different cultural forms of
child-caretaking that may involve informal types of adoption."
Nevertheless, the book leads to questions about the primacy
given to biological parenting and the consequent devaluing of
adoption. After showing the different standards for adoptive and

" See Susan Chira, Adoption is Getting Some Harder Looks, NY Times 4-1 (April 25,
1993); Bartholet, Blood Parents at A19.
10 See Joan H. Hollinger, ed, 1 Adoption Law and Practice § 1.05[3][b] at 1-67 (Matthew Bender, 1992), for a description of varying state regulations governing private adoptions. A colleague of mine who adopted a child outside the public agency context was upset
at Professor Bartholet's distortion of the experience, which, for her, involved significant
screening, bureaucracy and red tape.
Moreover, in place of public agencies, birth mothers often can conduct their own
screening. See, for example, Nancy Gibbs, The Baby Chase, Time 86 (Oct 9, 1989); Jerry
Carroll, Adopting a White Baby can be an Expensive Proposition,San Francisco Chronicle
B5 (Mar 6, 1990). As discussed below, the issue of "choice"-whether the birth mother has
any autonomy in this process-is complex, but there is at least an attempt at involvement.
" See, for example, Carol B. Stack, All Our Kin: Strategies For Survival In a Black
Community 62-89 (Harper & Row, 1974); Carol B. Stack, Cultural Perspectives on Child
Welfare, 12 NYU Rev L & Soc Change 539 (1983-84); Lynda Richardson, Adoptions that
Lack Papers, Not Purpose, NY Times Cl (Nov 25, 1993). Professor Bartholet does note
that the image of adoption in the United States differs from that in some other places, and
gives Tahiti as an example (p 169). Even in the United States, however, step-parents and
other relatives account for at least one-half of all formal adoptions. Joan H. Hollinger,
Adoption Law, 3 The Future of Children 43, 44 (Spring 1993).
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biological parents, she suggests how the legal system, nationally
and internationally, could be reformed to become more responsive
to the needs of children and adoptive parents alike. Professor
Bartholet thus provides a solid introduction to some of the debates
surrounding adoption laws in this country and powerful arguments
for changing these laws. Her insistence on an examination of the
biological underpinnings of contemporary definitions of the family
is a critical component in rethinking the family.
Understanding the need to change adoption law and the constraints against doing so requires an appreciation of how biological
childbearing affects men's and women's roles in our society. In
turn, questions about the relationship between parenting and biology help define the feminist agenda. As feminists challenge the
maxim that women's biology determines their destiny and begin to
confront the complexities of modern parenthood, they must address issues surrounding "biological" parental rights in adoption
simultaneously with issues raised by alternative reproductive technologies that separate genetic from gestational mothering.1 2 A discourse that depends on definitions of "natural" or "biological"
families is of limited utility to this enterprise.
In this Review, I locate Family Bonds within some of the contemporary feminist jurisprudential discussions. Although Professor
Bartholet did not explicitly set out to write a feminist critique of
adoption law, her book is helpful in framing the debates surrounding adoption. Adoption presents feminists with a series of dilemmas, but, in this Review, I will outline only two. First are issues
relating to the sameness and difference of adoptive and biological
families; second are issues relating to the socially-constructed
choice to become a mother. I contrast the right to become a biological parent with the screening process for becoming an adoptive
parent, the stigma of adoption, and the parameters of the choice to
become a parent at all. These issues are highly contested, and they
implicate fundamental social norms and stereotypes about men
2 For example, under California law, a woman who contributes the egg (the "genetic"

mother) to be carried to term by another woman (the "gestational" mother) is the child's

"natural" mother because the genetic mother intended to procreate the child and raise it as

her own. Johnson v Calvert, 19 Cal Rptr 2d 494, 500, 851 P2d 776, 782 (1993). See also
Beverly Horsburgh, Jewish Women, Black Women: Guarding Against the Oppression of
Surrogacy, 8 Berkeley Women's L J 29 (1993); Anita L. Allen, The Black Surrogate Mother,
8 Harv Blackletter J 17 (1991).
Feminists' primary responses to parenting issues have centered on workplace concerns
(such as pregnancy discrimination and family leave), issues of women's autonomy (such as
abortion and surrogate mothering), and questions of equality between parents at divorce
(such as child custody and support). Adoption has received much less attention.
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and women, mothers and fathers. While Family Bonds advocates
certain resolutions, the issues surrounding the rights and responsibilities of biological parent and child relationships merit further
questioning and the development of other approaches.
I.

RITES OF PARENTING

Professor Bartholet emphasizes throughout her book that biological and adoptive parents face very different sets of procedures
when they choose to become parents. Biological parents "retain the
sense that they are normal rights-bearing citizens," while adoptive
parents must undergo elaborate and intrusive regulatory processes
before they are eligible to adopt (p 33). This Section compares the
rights of biological and adoptive parents.
When one "natural" parent 3 sues the other biological parent
for custody of their child, almost all states apply a best interests of
the child standard to determine the appropriate custodian. When a
third party-not the biological parent-seeks to adopt the child,
the standard changes. Before recognizing the rights of a third party
to care for a child, most states require either that the biological
parents be deemed unfit 4 or that the biological parents voluntarily
relinquish their rights.
To some extent, the different standards for custody and adoption are justifiable: while a custody determination recognizes that
at least some parental rights remain with the non-custodial parent,
adoption is a more drastic action that cuts off all rights of the biological parents. But the difference in standards also reflects a social
choice that the rights of biological parents are more important
than the rights of the adoptive parents. Indeed, the "unfitness"
criteria may elevate the rights of the biological parents over the
rights of the child; rather than focus on what is best for the child,
the law examines the actions of the parents. 15
,1 While, as discussed in Section II, the definition of a "natural" parent is (and should
be) contested, I use the term here to refer either to the woman who has contributed the egg
and who has carried the resulting pregnancy to term, or to the man who has contributed the
sperm and/or is considered to be the legal father.
" To terminate parental rights, the state must prove certain grounds, such as abandonment, abuse, neglect, or nonsupport of the child. Hollinger, ed, 1 Adoption Law and Practice § 4.04[1] at (4-93)-(4-105) (cited in note 10).
'5 This emphasis on parental action is probably a good thing. We do not want the state
to impose class- or race-based standards of parenting by assuming that all children would be
better off with white, middle-class parents. See Marie Ashe and Naomi R. Cahn, Child
Abuse: A Problem for Feminist Theory, 2 Tex J Women & L 75, 98-100 (1993) (exploring
the arbitrariness of state definitions of child abuse); Dorothy E. Roberts, PunishingDrug
Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104 Harv
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A second right reserved for biological parents is the right to
consent to the adoption of their children, in contrast to the privilege of adoptive parents to adopt the children of others. In consenting to adoption, the rights of the birth mother and of her husband (if she is married) are virtually absolute, absent a
termination of parental rights by the state, although the rights of
the unwed mother and of the unwed father may be different.16 Historically, mothers (whether married or not) have always had the
power to consent to adoption, but unwed fathers had virtually no
such rights until the early 1970s. This different treatment
stemmed from the difficulty of determining the identity of the nat17
ural father, compared with the ease of identifying the mother.
Today, each parent has a varying amount of control over the
adoption process. If a father has no established relationship with
the child, he may have no constitutional right to notice of a proposed adoption, much less a right to object. 8 Particularly with
newborns, then, unwed fathers may have a limited set of rights. On
the other hand, Daniel Schmidt's eventually successful effort to recover baby Jessica demonstrates that states may provide substantial protection for a biological father's rights, even when he has,
prior to the birth of the child, made no effort to acknowledge paternity nor maintained a close relationship with the mother
throughout her pregnancy.
Meanwhile, there is no question that adoptive parents rely on
a privilege amounting, at best, to a nonvested right. Before qualify-

L Rev 1419, 1450-56 (1991); Dorothy E. Roberts, Motherhood and Crime, 79 Iowa L Rev
(1994) (forthcoming); Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A Child-Centered
Perspective on Parents' Rights, 14 Cardozo L Rev 1747, 1859-61 (1993); Martha Albertson
Fineman, Intimacy Outside of the NaturalFamily: The Limits of Privacy,23 Conn L Rev
955, 958-61 (1991).
" Hollinger, ed, 1 Adoption Law and Practice§ 2.0411] at (2-16)-(2-18) (cited in note
10). See also Katharine T. Bartlett, Re-Expressing Parenthood, 98 Yale L J 293, 315-26
(1988); Karen Czapanskiy, Volunteers and Draftees:The Struggle for ParentalEquality, 38
UCLA L Rev 1415, 1418-22 (1991).
17 Janet L. Dolgin, Just a Gene: Judicial Assumptions About Parenthood,40 UCLA L
Rev 637, 644 (1993); Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Reproductive Technology and Intent-Based
Parenthood: An Opportunity for Gender Neutrality, 1990 Wis L Rev 297, 316. Married
men, by contrast, have been assumed to be the father when their wives have babies. See, for
example, Michael H. v Gerald D., 491 US 110, 130 (1989) (upholding the constitutionality of
a state evidentiary rule that a child born to a married woman living with her husband is
presumed to be a child of the marriage).
18 See Lehr v Robertson, 463 US 248 (1983). The Lehr Court held that a state court did
not violate the biological father's due process rights when it denied his ability to challenge
an adoption order because he had failed to register with the state's putative father registry
and had provided no support to the two-year-old child. Id at 265. See also Bartlett, 98 Yale
L J at 317 (cited in note 16).
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fng to adopt a child, prospective parents must survive an elaborate
screening process. In most states, a child welfare agency or other
investigator must investigate such items as the parents' "emotional
maturity, finances, health, relationships, and any other factor
[that] may affect the petitioner's ability to accept, care, and provide" a home for the person to be adopted.1 9 Once the adoption
petition is filed, the court appoints an independent investigator to
20
verify the pre-adoption report.
Professor Bartholet reports that she "learn[ed] how to shape"
the story of her life to conform to the requirements of the adoption
process (p 65). She had to fill out questionnaires about her childhood, her sexual relationships, and other personal issues; she
learned that she must say that she had a happy childhood, was
heterosexual, and wanted children for the right reasons (pp 65-66).
She contrasts this screening process with the cloak of privacy that
protected her personal life when she was pregnant with her first
child and when she sought infertility treatment (p 69). Throughout
her many years of infertility treatment, which included highly invasive reproductive technology, no one questioned or tested her fitness to become a parent (id).2 ' Professor Bartholet rightly accuses
the adoption screening process of explicitly regulating the parenting process and of favoring those prospective parents who most
closely match the traditional biological nuclear family.22 While biological parenting is a vested right, adoption remains an earned
privilege.
Nonetheless, the dichotomy between biological and adoptive
families is somewhat more complex than Professor Bartholet suggests. First of all, there is more interdependence between the two
sets of families than her discussion recognizes. Adoption generally
consists of two separate actions: the termination of the rights of
one set of parents and the adoption of the child by a second set of
parents.2 3 Professor Bartholet, however, only briefly addresses the

' Iowa Code Ann § 600.8(1)(a)(2) (West 1981 & Supp 1993); Hollinger, ed, 2 Adoption
Law and Practice § 7.0212][b] at 7-23 (cited in note 10).
20 See, for example, Iowa Code Ann § 600.8(1)(b) (West 1981 & Supp 1993).
21 She does note that some of the infertility clinics indicated that they worked only

with married couples. Although unmarried, she was still accepted by these clinics with a
pretend husband (pp 192-93).
'2 This extends to policies of racial matching, a practice which Professor Bartholet condemns (pp 115-16).
2 Hollinger, ed, 1 Adoption Law and Practice § 4.0411] at 4-93 (cited in note 10). It is
difficult to generalize about adoption practices, given the variation in state laws. Still, while
the procedures themselves may be very different, many of the basic substantive steps are
similar.

The University of Chicago Law Review

[61:325

first issue. Her book presumes that the problem in the adoption
process is not the supply of adoptable children, but rather the
placement of these children with adoptive parents. She therefore
focuses on methods for simplifying and streamlining the adoption
process. Yet critiquing the practices by which children become
adoptable is critical to adoption reform efforts, and is interrelated
with the issue of when prospective parents can adopt.
By focusing on one moment in the adoption process-the
adoption itself-Professor Bartholet distorts the context in which
that moment occurs. The adoption experience begins with the biological parent(s), and continues throughout the child's life. Especially given Professor Bartholet's fight against the tyranny of biology, an examination of what rights biological or "natural" parents
do have would have helped the reader to understand the status
and rights of adoptive parents and adoptive children.
The fact that biological parenthood involves its own set of
screening processes further complicates the biological/adoptive distinction. Pregnant women are both implicitly and explicitly policed,2 4 reinforcing cultural norms of the good mother. They too
must undergo a screening process, albeit less elaborate than that
for adoptive parents. The law is particularly harsh when regulating
the behavior of poor and minority women. These women face an
explicit, authoritative state power.2 5 Especially when they are
drug-addicted, poor women are controlled by highly intrusive
forms of monitoring, such as charges of abuse and neglect and even
imprisonment. State authorities can threaten to remove a child
and place her in foster care. These actions constitute a direct, albeit a different kind of, screening process for appropriate mothers.
The distinction between biological and adoptive parenting nonetheless remains, grounded in the issue of who is biologically conneted to the child. There are minimal due process standards for
removing a child, while adoptive parents receive no comparable
guarantees.

"' See Helena R. Michie and Naomi R. Calm, Policing the Reproductive Body (forthcoming 1995) (exploring the implicit policing of middle-class, white pregnant women, and
the explicit policing of poor, black women); Lisa C. Ikemoto, The Code of Perfect Pregnancy: At the Intersection of the Ideology of Motherhood, the Practice of Defaulting to
Science and the Interventionist Mindset of Law, 53 Ohio St L J 1205 (1992); Nancy
Ehrenreich, The Colonization of the Womb, 43 Duke L J (forthcoming 1994).
25 See Michie and Cahn, Policing the Reproductive Body; Ehrenreich, 43 Duke L J;
Roberts, 104 Harv L Rev at 1450-56 (cited in note 15). Wealthier women, by contrast, are
policed by their husbands, the medical profession, waiters in restaurants, through books,
etc. See Michie and Calm, Policing the Reproductive Body.
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II. RIGHTS OF PARENTING
Though both natural and adoptive parents face explicit as well
as implicit regulation, natural and adoptive parenting represent
opposite ends of a continuum of rights based on biology. Family
Bonds questions the value accorded biological-as opposed to
adoptive-parenting. What rights should biological parents have?
Would it be more productive to think of all parents as having responsibilities to children and, thus, do away with the strong deference to biological parents? At times, Professor Bartholet suggests
different answers to these questions. Her lack of resolution reflects
the fact that these are extremely difficult questions, probably without definitive answers outside of any specific context.
As Professor Marie Ashe suggests, issues surrounding natural,
biological parenting versus non-biological parenting can be intensely divisive.2 6 Indeed, the feminist concerns relating to questions of sameness and difference can be "reproduced" in the adoption/child custody area. While few theorists have explicitly applied
feminism to adoption,27 a rich feminist jurisprudence addresses the
related issues of child custody and surrogacy. On one hand, difference theorists celebrate women's capacities for intimacy and bonding as distinct from those of men; on the other, sameness feminists
emphasize the capacity of all parents for nurturing. In the adoption context, this division might mean that difference feminists
would support a mother's right to keep her child under virtually
any circumstances (such as in the surrogacy context), while sameness feminists might, instead, emphasize comparative parental
roles and responsibilities. More fundamentally, the issues
surrounding whether biological and adoptive families are the same
or different, and the policy implications of any conclusion, remain
unresolved. This Section explores these themes. 8

26

Telephone conversation with Professor Marie Ashe (Aug 4, 1993) See works cited in

note 33. See also Marjorie M. Shultz, Abortion and Maternal-FetalConflict: Broadening
our Concerns, 1 S Cal Rev L & Women's Studies 79, 94 (1992) (noting that she and many
other people have "intensely schizophrenic feelings about the role of biology in life and in
policy").
,' But see Bartlett, 98 Yale L J 293 (cited in note 16); Czapanskiy, 38 UCLA L Rev
1415 (cited in note 16).
'1 Of course, other feminist orientations might well develop different approaches. For
example, postmodern feminism might simply accept the possibility that children can have
several mothers and fathers at the same time, with no individual having a more important
set of rights. Pragmatic feminism might suggest a case-by-case contextual examination,
rather than rigid rules. See generally Margaret Jane Radin, The Pragmatistand the Feminist, 63 S Cal L Rev 1699 (1990). Given that sameness and difference are two of the most
important theoretical schools of feminism, however, I focus on them.
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Some feminist writers have celebrated the intimate connection
between a mother and her child. As one way of showing the differences between men and women, these feminists have emphasized
the distinctive connection that women feel to their children, beginning while the fetus is in utero and continuing throughout the
child's life. Women's reproductive experiences and their traditional
role as nurturer influence their capacity for connection.2 9 According to this view, mothers develop a special bond with their babies
that fathers do not necessarily share.30
Professor Robin West has written of the closeness between a
pregnant woman and her fetus, the manner in which a pregnant
woman's "biological life embraces the embryonic life of another,"
and the fact that once the child is born, the mother's needs include
those of her child."' In Sacred Bond: The Legacy of Baby M,

Phyllis Chesler speaks of the importance of the mother/child
bonding process and argues that, unless there is something "drastically, incurably, dangerously wrong with a birth mother, she should
be entitled to keep her child." 2 And Professor Ashe also explores
the close identification that a pregnant woman may feel with her
fetus.33 Through this literature runs a recognition and appreciation
of the mother-child-fetus interrelationship. This perspective acknowledges women's connectedness based on the biological exper-

29

Because of their experiences of nurturing, women are more likely to develop an ethic

of care, under which they focus on relationship rather than hierarchy. See generally Carol
Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development (Harvard,
1982); Carol Gilligan, Janie Victoria Ward, and Jill McLean Taylor, eds, Mapping The
Moral Domain:A Contribution of Women's Thinking to Psychological Theory and Education (Harvard, 1988); Naomi R. Cahn, Theoretics of Practice: The Integration of Progressive Thought and Action: Styles of Lawyering, 43 Hastings L J 1039 (1992).
3o But see Mary Becker, MaternalFeelings: Myth, Taboo, and Child Custody, 1 S Cal
Rev L & Women's Studies 133, 144 (1992) (discussing the dangers of emphasizing that
women have a special connection to children). Professor Becker suggests that women may
not want to focus on biological connections to their children because, on the one hand, caretaking may not be based on biology and, on the other hand, focusing on biology may lead to
the conclusion that it is woman's destiny to provide nurturing. Id at 159. Nonetheless, she
urges women to speak of this connection as a method to achieve equality. Id at 165-67.
'3 Robin L. West, The Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives: A PhenomenologicalCritique of Feminist Legal Theory, 3 Wis Women's L J 81, 140 (1987). See also Robin West,
Jurisprudenceand Gender, 55 U Chi L Rev 1, 2-3 (1988); Note, Rethinking (M)otherhood:
Feminist Theory and State Regulation of Pregnancy,103 Harv L Rev 1325, 1338-39 (1990).
32Phyllis Chesler, Sacred Bond: The Legacy of Baby M 145 (Random House, 1988).
33 Marie Ashe, Zig-Zag Stitching and the Seamless Web: Thoughts on 'Reproduction'
and the Law, 13 Nova L Rev 355, 375 (1989); Marie Ashe, Law-Language of Maternity:
Discourse Holding Nature in Contempt, 22 New England L Rev 521, 549-51 (1988).
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iences of pregnancy and motherhood. 4 It also strongly supports
the mother's right to custody as against others.
Not quite on the other side of the debate, although with a different emphasis, are feminists who either emphasize the importance of more gender-neutral values, such as nurturing or responsibility, in the parenting relationship, rather than an intuitive and
natural biological bond, or who focus almost solely on the interests
of the child. Noting the possibility that new reproductive technologies could create children with multiple sets of parents, Professor
Marjorie Maguire Shultz suggests intent as a neutral basis for assigning parental rights.3 5 The person(s) who intend to create a
child and to assume responsibility for her should be legally identified as her parents.3 6 Professor Karen Czapanskiy suggests a reconceptualization of the definition of parenting, such that "a parent is
the person who, by procreation,conduct or adoption" commits "to
provide all the nurturance, whether financial, or nonfinancial, of
which the person is capable; and second, a commitment to deal
respectfully and supportively with another person or persons who
are in a parental relationship with the same child. '3 7 Similarly,
Professor Katharine Bartlett suggests that family law should reorient parenthood toward responsibility and connection and away
from the current emphasis on rights.3 8 Professor Barbara Bennett
Woodhouse calls for a child-centered approach, focusing on children's needs and experiences instead of on parental rights, and argues that expectations of fathering should become more like those
of mothering.3 9 These attempts all examine how parents perform
their roles, and the impact on the child of parental performance,
rather than assuming that parents will naturally fill their roles.
What these various gender-neutral approaches could mean in the
adoption area is that parents who have nurtured a child-like the
DeBoers-would become legally responsible for the child, notwithstanding the interests of the biological parents. 0

" See Note, 103 Harv L Rev at 1338-42 (cited in note 31).
35 Shultz, 1990 Wis L Rev 297 (cited in note 17).

36Id at 323.

11 Czapanskiy, 38 UCLA L Rev at 1464 (cited in note 16) (emphasis added).
11 Bartlett, 98 Yale L J at 295, 337 (cited in note 16).
11 Woodhouse, 14 Cardozo L Rev 1747 (cited in note 15).
40 While Karen Czapanskiy believes that biology alone should not give parents the right
to control their child, she has suggested that birth parents should be able to change their
minds about adoption during the first six months of the baby's life, unless this would "compromise" the child's interests. Czapanskiy, 38 UCLA L Rev at 1476-80 (cited in note 16).
This is important, she believes, "because of the investment and sacrifice of giving birth,
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In the somewhat related area of surrogacy, feminists have engaged in extensive discussions over the past decade.4 ' The same
concerns with parenting, biology, and responsibility reappear.
When a surrogate mother changes her mind and seeks to keep her
child, complex issues arise relating to the rights of each of the biological parents and the best interests of the child. The natural
mother has endured (or enjoyed) a nine-month pregnancy, while
the natural father has merely contributed sperm. Yet all potential
parents have contributed time, effort, and hope.
Feminist discussions of surrogacy have concentrated on
women's autonomy instead of children's interests.4 2 Some feminists
support the surrogate mother and her ability to abrogate any contract;43 some advocate the outlawing of surrogacy contracts altogether as exploitative of all women, especially poor women and
women of color.4 4 From the latter perspective, surrogacy turns
women of color into walking wombs for the gestation of white children.46 Other feminists use a market analogy to argue that women
should be entitled to sell their reproductive services. 4 6 More pragmatic feminists, or some lesbian feminists, might argue that surrogacy has the positive potential to disrupt the nuclear family by
among other reasons." Correspondence from Professor Czapanskiy (Sep 28, 1993) (on file
with U Chi L Rev).
41 Surrogacy can take several forms. In the Baby M case, Mary Beth Whitehead, who
was inseminated with the sperm of Daniel Stern, was both the genetic and gestational
mother. Matter of Baby M, 109 NJ 396, 414, 537 A2d 1227, 1236 (1988). By comparison, in
Johnson v Calvert, 19 Cal Rptr 2d 494, 496, 851 P2d 776, 778 (1993), Ms. Johnson had an
embryo formed from the sperm and egg of Mark and Crispina Calvert, making her the gestational, though not the genetic, mother. For a summary, see Martha A. Field, Surrogate
Motherhood (Harvard, 2d ed 1990); Horsburgh, 8 Berkeley Women's L J at 42-48 (cited in
note 12); Nancy Ehrenreich, Surrogacy as Resistance? The Misplaced Focus on Choice in
the Surrogacy and Abortion Funding Contexts, 41 DePaul L Rev 1369, 1374-87 (1992) (reviewing Carmel Shalev, Birth Power: The Case for Surrogacy (Yale, 1989)); Colloquy: In Re
Baby M, 76 Georgetown L J 1717 (1988).
42 See Ehrenreich, 41 DePaul L Rev at 1373.
43 See, for example, Deborah L. Rhode, Justice and Gender: Sex Discrimination and
the Law 225 (Harvard, 1989); Field, Surrogate Motherhood at 10-11.
44 See, for example, Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability,100 Harv L Rev 1849,
1916 (1987); Margaret Jane Radin, Reflections on Objectification, 65 S Cal L Rev 341, 34954 (1991); Allen, 8 Harv Blackletter J at 31 (cited in note 12).
Several states have adopted this approach. See, for example, DC Code Encyc § 16-402
(Michie 1993); Ariz Rev Stat § 25-218 (West 1989); La Rev Stat Ann § 9:2713 (West 1987);
Mich Comp Laws Ann § 722.855 (West 1988) (all prohibiting and rendering unenforceable
any surrogacy contracts).
46 See Horsburgh, 8 Berkeley Women's L J at 35-36 (cited in note 12); Allen, 8 Harv
Blackletter J at 31 (cited in note 12).
4' See Carmel Shalev, Birth Power: The Case for Surrogacy (Yale, 1989); Shultz, 1990
Wis L Rev at 301-03 (cited in note 17). For a brief summary and critique, see Radin, 65 S
Cal L Rev at 349-54.
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creating more than one mother with a genetic (or social) relationship to a child.4 7
Overall, the surrogacy debate has remained focused on the
surrogate mother's biological connection to the child.48 But to the
extent that surrogacy continues to exist, the emphasis on biology
in determining parental rights should be questioned. Perhaps a
best interests of the child standard-if it could be applied so as
not to favor the traditional family 49-might be a more appropriate
method for thinking through post-surrogacy custody issues, given
that the dispute is between biological parents anyway. Alternatively, perhaps the biological connection should be the most significant factor in any such legal decision, especially because of the inevitable bias in determining the best interests of the child.
While feminist discussion of biology is comparatively well-developed as it relates to custody and even to surrogacy, only recently has it spilled over into the adoption context. Perhaps this is
because feminists have never really questioned the primacy of biological parenting in the legal system, 50 and because biological
parenting is only now facing challenges as technological developments increasingly manipulate the parameters of biological
parenting.

III.

THE BIOLOGY OF ADOPTION

In the adoption context, this debate over biology could address many interrelated issues. First, and perhaps most simple, are
issues relating to the continuing relationship between the biologi-

47 See Radin, 65 S Cal L Rev at 352 (cited in note 44) (pragmatic perspective); Bartlett,
98 Yale L J at 334 (cited in note 16). While lesbian feminists seem not to have considered
the possibility of surrogacy for disrupting the nuclear family, they have made similar argu-

ments with respect to marriage. See Nan D. Hunter, Marriage,Law, and Gender: A Feminist Inquiry, in Law & Sexuality Symposium: The Family in the 1990s: An Exploration of

Lesbian and Gay Rights, 1 Law & Sexuality 1, 9 (1991). Multiple adults in connection with
any child may lead to a redefinition of parenting. On the other hand, pragmatic and lesbian
feminists might argue that surrogacy, by definition, is exploitive.
41 See, for example, Note, GestationalSurrogacy: Unsettling State ParentageLaw and

Surrogacy Policy, 19 NYU Rev L & Soc Change 571, 580 (1992) (advocating different legal
approaches to surrogate mothers who contribute the egg and to surrogate mothers who gestate another woman's egg, based on the different biological connections).
41 See Dolgin, 40 UCLA L Rev 637 (cited in note 17).
51 Historically, of course, there have been various reform efforts to improve child welfare. But these have been class-based undertakings as society worked through its definitions
of appropriate caretaking. See Linda Gordon, Heroes Of Their Own Lives: The Politics and
History of Family Violence: Boston 1880-1960 (Viking, 1988); Elizabeth Pleck, Domestic
Tyranny: The Making of Social Policy Against Family Violence From Colonial Times to
the Present (Oxford, 1987). The issue of biology in defining parenting was not important.
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cal parents and the child, such as how long each parent should
have to change his or her mind about the adoption, and whether
any adoption should be "open" (that is, allowing future contact between the biological parent(s) and the child). Existing state law
varies as to how long the biological mother actually has to change
her mind, ranging from three months to any time prior to the entry of the final adoption order. 51 An emphasis on the rights of the
biological mother suggests a longer time period for reconsideration
of adoption, while a recognition of the rights of the adoptive parents suggests that a shorter time period may be appropriate. As for
"open adoption," this might be in the interests of all parents and
the child-or it might not. While open adoption solves some issues,
such as the harshness of cutting all ties between the biological parent and her child, it creates other problems as all family members
search to define their new relationships. A related question concerns whether the rights of the biological mother should be the
same as those of the biological father, and whether the marital status of the biological parents is relevant in determining the father's
rights. Under existing law, a father who is married to the mother
52
may possess greater rights than an unmarried biological father.
Biology also implicates the relationship of adoption to other
custody issues, including the protection of the child's interests
throughout the adoption process and the relationship between the
regulation of adoption and that of new reproductive technologies. 3
Perhaps courts should treat a child born as the result of a surrogacy agreement gone awry as they would treat a child to be
adopted.
A final set of issues concerns the adoptive parents and explores how people should qualify for adoption and how the stigma
of adoption can be overcome. The adoption procedure is quite rig-

5 Hollinger, ed, 2 Adoption Law and Practice§ 8.02[1][a][i] at (8-12)-(8-15) (cited in
note 10).
52 See notes 17-18. Martha Albertson Fineman suggests "abolish[ing] marriage as a le-

gal category" so that no relationships between adults would be privileged. 23 Conn L Rev at
970 (cited in note 15). Such a concept obviously requires a reconceptualization of a father's
rights in adoption proceedings so that they do not simply depend on a legalized relationship.
But see Shultz, 1 S Cal Rev L & Women's Studies at 92-94 (cited in note 26) (discussing her
discomfort with excluding men from women's reproductive decisions).
13 See Baby M, 109 NJ 396, 537 A2d 1227 (exploring the appropriate standard for judging custody between a surrogate mother and the contracting parents); Shultz, 1990 Wis L
Rev at 375 (cited in note 17); Hollinger, ed, 2 Adoption Law and Practice § 14.02 at (14-6)(14-12) (cited in note 10). See also Dolgin, 40 UCLA L Rev at 692-93 (cited in note 17)
(exploring how judges reinforce conventional family norms in cases concerning the new reproductive technologies).
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orous for would-be parents, and, in light of adoption's second-class
status, yet another hurdle that the adoptive parents must overcome. Alternatively, the adoption standards can be seen as protecting children, providing them with the best environment.
Because Professor Bartholet focuses on this final set of issues,
I will as well.
A.

Standards For Adoption

Given the different standards applied to biological and adoptive parents seeking custody, Professor Bartholet argues that adoption screening standards should more closely resemble the criteria
she claims are used to assess the unfitness of biological parents (p
78)." In light of her view that no one can evaluate what makes a
family happy, existing screening practices seem, to her, simply to
set up roadblocks to adoption. Instead, she would allow parents to
adopt so long as a screening process turned up no "past history of
serious and persistent drug or alcohol abuse, prior child abuse, apparent incapacity to provide for a child's most basic needs, serious
ill health, or advanced age" (p 78).'5 This proposal would help
adoptive parents and, Professor Bartholet argues, would help children by providing them with a nurturing situation more
expeditiously.
Nonetheless, these standards raise several questions.5 Although Professor Bartholet seems to suggest that the dichotomy
between adoptive and biological parenting should be abandoned
when it comes to evaluating fitness, she herself continues to respect it. First of all, to the extent that Professor Bartholet believes
that adoptive parents should have rights comparable to those of
biological parents, the standards should also be comparable. But if,
as she suggests, her proposed adoptive parent criteria would be unconstitutional as applied to biological parents (p 79), then these
criteria are too stringent. Second, from a child-centered perspec-

' Professor Bartholet is not alone in criticizing the screening process. See Hollinger,
ed, 2 Adoption Law and Practice § 5.02[2] at 5-12 (cited in note 10) (criticizing the legal
presumption that a biological parent who does a poor job of parenting is preferable to an
adoptive parent who does a good job); Hollinger, ed, 1 Adoption Law and Practice
§ 1.05[3][a] at 1-64.
55 In an interview after the publication of Family Bonds, Professor Bartholet stated
that she would not "object to minimal screening, designed to eliminate child abusers and
people who were below any minimum threshold in terms of the economic wherewithal to
support a child. But apart from that, I would get rid of it." Lisa Funderburg, Why Can't
Adoption be Multicultural?,NY Newsday 75 (May 25, 1993).
56 Definitions present another problem. What is "serious ill health" or "advanced age?"
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tive, if a child has the right to a nurturing environment, this right
should be unaffected by whether she lives with her biological or
adoptive parents. It is unclear whether Professor Bartholet really
believes that the standard for parenting should be the same. If so,
this belief would demand an equalization of the current hierarchy
between biological and non-biological families, but would also raise
issues concerning the propriety of removing children from their biological parents.
For feminists, these issues center on the significance of biology
in recognizing parental rights. At what point do biological parents
lose their preference? Shouldn't biological parenting receive some
protection, especially given the nine months of pregnancy, childbirth, and the ensuing child care? And what about the state's arbitrary, terminations of parental rights? Perhaps biological and adoptive parents should be held to the same best interests of the child
standard. Then again, the balancing of rights must also include the
interests of children, interests which are too often excluded by the
law.57 Feminists need to recognize the child's interest in stability,
the interests of the birth mother in raising the child, and the interests of the adoptive parents. This approach is illustrated by a Vermont court's resolution of an adoption case on facts similar to the
DeBoer/Clausen dispute.58 The court awarded a biological father
visitation rights while awarding custody to the adoptive family.
Such a solution treats the biological and adoptive families comparably, and, perhaps, equitably.
B.

The Stigma of Adoption

The sameness/difference dilemma also appears when it comes
to the stigma of adoption: Are adoptive families the same as biological families? As Professor Bartholet points out, our society
ranks adoption as a second-class option. She claims that during her
years of infertility treatment, the specialists treating her never
counseled her about the option of adoption. Instead, she was repeatedly encouraged to pursue ever more invasive medical technologies, with no discussion of alternatives. Only after she had almost
exhausted her resources (financially and emotionally) did she decide to adopt.

57 See Martha Minow, Making all the Difference: Inclusion, Exclusion, and American
Law 283, 285 (Cornell, 1990).
" See Pact is Reached in Vermont Adoption Case, NY Times A12 (Aug 23, 1993).
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Part of her experience undoubtedly resulted from what Professor Bartholet identifies as the "stigma" of adoption-the view of
adoption as a second-best alternative to having one's "own" babies.
Thus, the decision to adopt becomes not so much a choice as a
last-resort means of becoming a parent. 59 This leads Professor
Bartholet to recommend several changes in existing policy and attitudes: First, that society (as expressed primarily through health
insurance policies) not support the more invasive infertility treatments, such as in vitro fertilization; and second, that we, as a culture, challenge the stigma of adoption. Both of her suggestions
raise larger issues for a feminist agenda on biology and children.
1.

Funding infertility treatments.

Professor Bartholet regrets the years she spent on the "treadmill" of infertility treatment, pursuing yet one more cycle of in vitro fertilization (IVF) 60 in her desperate hope for a biological child.
She believes that the trend toward insurance coverage of IVF is
destructive because it will encourage women to continue often-futile treatment. 1 In Professor Bartholet's view, the increasing use of
IVF conditions women to want only biological children and renders
adoption a rather undesirable option (p 215). Her solutions involve
improving counseling for the infertile so that they understand the
risks of various treatments, removing the hurdles in the adoption
process, and creating incentives to adopt. While the information
she provides suggests that these may be important measures, her
analysis reflects the notion that women are unable to choose the
appropriate non-biological option because of the strong, sociallyconstructed imperative toward biological childbearing. For example, while mandatory counseling ensures informed consent to undergo invasive medical procedures, it is also paternalistic to impose
such a requirement. Ultimately, Professor Bartholet advocates restricting women's options to undergo infertility treatments because

" The notion of "choice" when it comes to infertility treatments or adoption begs the
underlying issue of women choosing to become mothers. Part of Professor Bartholet's own
experience is almost certainly due to women's socialization into motherhood, a socialization
Professor Bartholet was initially uncertain she had received but which is a pervasive component of the messages women receive in this society. See Michie and Cahn, Policing the
Reproductive Body (cited in note 24); Roberts, 79 Iowa L Rev (cited in note 15).
'o For a description of IVF procedures, see Lori B. Andrews and Lisa Douglass, Alternative Reproduction, 65 S Cal L Rev 623, 641-52 (1991); Developments in the
Law-Medical Technology and the Law, 103 Harv L Rev 1519, 1537-42 (1990).
" The success rate is less than 15 percent per procedure. Robert Pear, Fertility Clinics
Face Crackdown, NY Times A15 (Oct 26, 1992).
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she believes women's decisions to pursue such treatments cannot
be freely and validly made.
In this area, Professor Bartholet draws heavily on some feminists' consideration of the new reproductive technologies. This
"patriarchal reproduction" position fears that women are unable to
choose the new technologies voluntarily and that instead, male
doctors simply appropriate women's bodies to produce children.
Gena Corea, one of the leading proponents of this perspective, argues that the concepts of "choice" and "consent" with respect to
women's participation in assisted reproduction are artificial on two
levels: women's actual understanding of the technology and the patriarchal structuring of women's lives.6 2 According to Corea,
women are victimized by a society that values them for producing
children; they do not choose the new reproductive technologies so
much as they are socially coerced to choose.13 Catharine MacKinnon has made similar arguments with respect to the authenticity of
women's voices, emphasizing that women are unable to make valid
choices under patriarchy. 4 In other words, infertile women are socialized into wanting biological children and, therefore, the law
should foreclose the possibility of choosing the new technologies so
that women are not victimized.
While this "patriarchal reproduction" analysis presents a significant and cautionary perspective, it nonetheless both denies
women any agency and also reinforces the restrictions on options
by income and class. By denying the possibility of choice under
existing social conditions, this view treats women as passive victims, unable to genuinely choose reproductive technologies. An alternative perspective might recognize that women have helped to
shape the new technologies, or that women have, at least in some
sense, chosen to undergo the risks associated with them. While
women may not have full autonomy, because all of their experiences are mediated through a culture which reinforces biological
motherhood, they may still look to technology as means of empowerment. 5 The dichotomy between women as victims of technology

2 Corea shows how the first women to undergo in vitro fertilization had no idea that
the procedures were experimental, and believed that many babies had already been born
through IVF. Gena Corea, The Mother Machine 166-69 (Harper & Row, 1985).
63 Id.
64

Catherine MacKinnon, Towards a Feminist Theory of the State 126-54 (Harvard,

1989).
5 See Barbara Katz Rothman, Recreating Motherhood: Ideology and Technology in a
PatriarchalSociety 63, 140-51 (W.W. Norton, 1989) (summarizing the view that technological advancement empowers women).
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and women as agents in needing and demanding the technology is
false.6 6 Instead, while women make choices constructed by and
within a social ideology that values childbearing, they are still able
to exercise some control over their options within these social
constraints.
Arguing that women are unable to make their own decisions
about reproductive technology reflects an outmoded view of
women as dependent, passive creatures, without a corresponding
recognition of the context in which these choices are constructed. 7
Instead of taking away options for women, the focus should be on
reforming the surrounding social ideology: motherhood at any cost.
Professor Bartholet makes a related, and more practical argument that IVF may eliminate the possibility of parenting because,
by the time they have finished their medical treatment, some patients are too old and too exhausted to adopt (p 207). She provides
no statistics or studies for this conclusion; it appears to be speculation based, perhaps, on her own experiences.6 8 In addition, by focusing on reproductive technology and the pressures for biological
parenting, or even on the empowering possibilities of adoption,
Professor Bartholet leaves unchallenged the more general social
discipline on women to become mothers. A celebration of adoptive

0' Juliette Zipper and Selma Sevenhuijsen, Surrogacy: Feminist Notions of Motherhood Reconsidered, in Michelle Stanworth, ed, Reproductive Technologies: Gender, Motherhood and Medicine 118-26 (Minnesota, 1987). Michelle Stanworth provides a good summary of the defects of the patriarchal reproduction model:
In the first place, this analysis entails an exaggerated view of the power of science and
medicine. . . . Second,. . . infertile women are too often portrayed as "desperate people," rendered incapable by pronatal pressures of making rational and ethical decisions.
. . . Third, this theoretical account sometimes seems to suggest that anything "less"
than a natural process, from conception through to birth, represents the degradation of
motherhood itself.
Michelle Stanworth, Birth Pangs: Conceptive Technologies and the Threat to Motherhood,
in Marianne Hirsch and Evelyn Fox Keller, eds, Conflicts in Feminism 288, 289 (Routledge,
1990).
67 See Joan Williams, Gender Wars: Selfless Women in the Republic of Choice, 66
NYU L Rev 1559, 1574, 1615 (1991); Kathryn Abrams, Ideology and Women's Choices, 24
Ga L Rev 761, 784-85 (1990).
" Her own experience actually belies this assertion because Professor Bartholet
adopted after ten years of struggling to have a biological child. Throughout the book, Professor Bartholet's conclusions are presented as neutral and objective, when they in fact are
not-they represent only one approach to the dilemmas she addresses. For a further discussion of the need for a multiplicity of stories and perspectives, see Kathryn Abrams, Hearing
the Call of Stories, 79 Cal L Rev 971 (1991); Naomi R. Cahn, Inconsistent Stories, 81
Georgetown L J 2475 (1993); Charles R. Lawrence, III, The Word and the River: Pedagogy
as Scholarshipas Struggle, 65 S Cal L Rev 2231, 2278-91 (1992); Mari Matsuda, When the
First Quail Calls: Multiple Consciousness as JurisprudentialMethod, 11 Women's Rts L
Rptr 7 (1989).
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parenting still does not question a gendered socialization process in
which women are expected to become mothers and to perform the
appropriate caretaking roles.6 9
A second criticism focuses on the potential class and race implications of Professor Bartholet's approach: discouraging funding
for the reproductive technologies will have a heavier impact on
poor and middle-class women, who have generally been unable to
afford this technology.7 0 The expense of the new technologies-a
single IVF cycle may cost approximately $10,000 7 1 -has generally
denied poor women even the opportunity to "choose" them; restricting access further essentially prevents poor women from ever
being able to use them. Indeed, continuation of existing methods
for funding IVF reinforces a situation in which the techology allows only rich white women to bear biological children. 72 Antiabortion activists have pursued a similar strategy, believing that
denying funding for abortion will discourage women from choosing
abortion. The impact of such a policy is, however, most clearly felt
by poor women, who cannot afford abortions, while the middleclass and wealthy are more easily able to exercise their abortion
choices. 73 Likewise, decreased funding for infertility treatment will
not affect wealthier women, who will still be able to afford the
treatment. While Professor Bartholet recognizes that limiting insurance coverage will affect poorer women, she dismisses this argument because she does not believe IVF is a benefit to anyone (p
213).

"9See Williams, 66 NYU L Rev at 1566 (cited in note 67); Mardy S. Ireland, Reconceiving Women: SeparatingMotherhood From Female Identity 1-16 (Guilford, 1993).
70 For black women, such limitations on the ability to reproduce have been a historical
form of discrimination. "Discouraging black procreation is a means of subordinating the
entire race; under patriarchy, it is accomplished through the regulation of black women's
fertility." Dorothy E. Roberts, Crime, Race, and Reproduction, 67 Tulane L Rev 1945, 1977
(1993).
7' See Bruce Hilton, Health in Perspective, Chicago Tribune C7 (Dec 18, 1992) (IVF
costs $8,000 to $13,000 per attempt); Andrews and Douglass, 65 S Cal L Rev at 635 (cited in
note 60) (infertility workup. and IVF costs approximately $22,000).
72 Susan Sherwin, No Longer Patient:Feminist Ethics and Health Care 134 (Temple,
1992). Professors Sherwin and Bartholet do suggest, helpfully, that reproductive research
might more profitably be directed toward investigation of the causes of infertility rather
than the cures.
73Note, The Impact of Public Abortion Funding Decisions on Indigent Women: A
Proposal to Reform State Statutory and ConstitutionalAbortion Funding Provisions,24 U
Mich J L Ref 371, 384-88 (1991).
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Because reproductive technologies develop and exist as part of
a larger culture, they must be evaluated within that context. 7 In
general, the notion that women should not have access to the reproductive technologies (or that such technologies should not even
be developed) is paternalistic and seems to echo an outdated belief
that the infertile do not deserve medical treatment. 5 On the other
hand, the medicalization of fertility, pregnancy, and childbirth,
and the consequent usurping of a woman's choice not to avail herself of the techniques for motherhood, all raise legitimate fears. As
technology becomes more accessible, there is certainly more pressure on women to use it. 7 6 The challenge, then, is to reconstruct
the choices women (and men) confront when they seek to become
parents.
2.

Adoption, and last chances.

Professor Bartholet devotes an entire chapter to the stigma of
adoption, discussing the cultural conditioning that emphasizes the
importance of blood ties within families (ch 8). As she points out,
the law values the biological part of parenting. This valuation mirrors more general societal attitudes toward biological parenting, infertility, and adoption. Here, adoption is a choice when there are
no other options for becoming a parent. Adoption has a "dark history . . . . Until very recently, every party to the transaction bore
the scars of its language: 'promiscuous,' 'barren,' 'illegitimate.' ,77

74 Susan Sherwin, Feminist and Medical Ethics: Two Different Approaches to Medical
Ethics, in Helen Bequaert Holmes and Laura M. Purdy, eds, Feminist Perspectives in Medical Ethics 17, 24-25 (Indiana, 1992); Leslie Bender, Teaching Feminist Perspectives on
Health Care Ethics and Law: A Review Essay, 61 U Cin L Rev 1251, 1265 (1993).
71 Margarete J. Sandelowski, Failures of Volition: Female Agency and Infertility in
Historical Perspective, 15 Signs 475, 493, 498-99 (1990).
7' See Judith D. Schwartz, The Mother Puzzle 214 (Simon & Schuster, 1993) (discussing the pressures on women to use amniocentesis). In a study of the relationship between
the use of ultrasound and the diagnosis of birth defects, researchers found that, notwithstanding widespread adoption of the technology, it did not improve perinatal outcome in
low-risk women. Bernard G. Ewigman, et al, Effect of Prenatal Ultrasound Screening on
Perinatal Outcome, 329 New Eng J Medicine 821 (Sep 16, 1993). See also Richard L.
Berkowitz, Should Every Pregnant Woman Undergo Ultrasonography?,329 New Eng J
Medicine 874 (Sep 16, 1993). When it comes to infertility, the pressure is, not coincidentally,
on women. Even though infertility is due approximately 40 percent of the time to male
factor problems, and 40 percent of the time to female factor problems, it is the woman who
must undergo most medical procedures. See Judith Lorber, Choice, Gift, or Patriarchal
Bargain? Women's Consent to In Vitro Fertilizationin Male Infertility, in Helen Bequaert
Holmes and Laura M. Purdy, eds, Feminist Perspectives in Medical Ethics 169, 171 (Indiana, 1992).
7 Gibbs, Baby Chase at 86 (cited in note 10). See also Tamar Lewin, The Strain on the
Bonds of Adoption, NY Times 4-1 (Aug 8,1993) (noting that adoptive parents feel they are
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Historically, women have been defined by their biological reproductive functions. Women who were unable to bear children, or
who chose not to do so, have been stigmatized and figured as incomplete.7 8 Even in contemporary United States culture,
they-and others-may feel that they are not really women. For
example, in one study of attitudes toward childbearing women,
"[m]arried women who explicitly state that they have no wish to
reproduce themselves are condemned for not being 'real
women.' ,,7 Professor Bartholet is extremely sensitive to the negative stereotypes of people involved in the adoption process (particularly the adoptive mother), in which, for example, adoption is
seen as a devalued form of parenting, or adoptive children are pitied (pp 164-70). She counters these stereotypes by showing that
adoption is better for the child than other options, such as placement in institutions or foster homes; better for the adoptive parents because they now have a child; and better for single birth
mothers, whose socioeconomic status is likely to increase after giving up their child (p 179).
Though Professor Bartholet lists the advantages of adoption
for other groups involved in the process, her chapter on the stigma
of adoption is primarily concerned with the adoptive family. But
such a focus is too limited-the stigma of adoption is more pervasive. Consider the stigma the birth mother may feel.8 0 For her, giving up a child can be profoundly and emotionally scarring. Indeed,
a "double-edged stigma attache[s] to being a birth mother, that
marks [them] as women who both conceived a child outside of

"perceived as somehow second-class parents"). Barbara Katz Rothman points out that
"adoption is the embodiment of all of our deepest cultural contradictions about motherhood." Recreating Motherhood at 125 (cited in note 65).
78 See, for example, Ireland, Reconceiving Women at 1, 7, 8 (cited in note 69);
Schwartz, The Mother Puzzle at 168 (cited in note 76); Alison Solomon, Infertility as Crisis: Coping, Surviving, and Threatening,in Renate D. Klein, ed, Infertility: Women Speak
Out About Their Experiences of Reproductive Medicine 169, 180 (Pandora, 1989).
" Zipper and Sevenhuijsen, Surrogacy at 131 (cited in note 66). See also Medical Technology and the Law, 103 Harv L Rev at 1526 (cited in note 60).
80 Professor Bartholet rarely addresses this pain. She acknowledges at one point that
"[b]irth parents no doubt do generally feel significant pain at the prospect of severing their
relationship to the child they have created and in some sense 'known' during pregnancy, and
in my view they should ....
I am prepared to think there are other good things to be said
for biologic parenting ....
" (p 181) (emphasis added). Her underlying attitude seems
somewhat condescending toward the birth parents and without adequate recognition of the
sorrow they might feel upon relinquishing their children.
The adopted child may also feel stigmatized. Professor Bartholet notes the common
perception that adopted children are not as well-adjusted as children who remain in their
biological families. See also Gibbs, Baby Chase at 87-88 (cited in note 10).
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marriage and 'gave away' that child." ' That is, these women are
condemned for getting pregnant in the first place, so that giving up
their children appears to be the only appropriate response; they
are then condemned for the unnaturalness of their decision to give
up their children."2
Recent years have seen two conflicting trends as birth mothers
speak out about their experiences. Some favor restricting adoptions even further. Other birth mothers, however, seek to obtain
respect for having given up their children. While the first trend
threatens Professor Bartholet's agenda, the second could bolster
her proposals. Indeed, Maureen Sweeney, a legal services lawyer
who is also a birth mother, suggests a new adoption "paradigm"
that is strikingly similar to the one Bartholet proposes: a process in
which adoption is recognized as an appropriate and positive outcome for the birth mother and the child. 3 Sweeney's proposal focuses on making the whole process more comfortable for the birth
mother. But the underlying agenda, like Bartholet's, seeks to make
adoption less of a last resort and a more respectable choice for all
involved.
In the past, one of the principal strategies for lessening the
stigma of adoption was to attempt to replicate the family that the
adoptive couple and the child would have had, absent adoption.
This included attempts to match people of the same ethnic and
racial origins, so that the family would look like a biologically

", Maureen

A. Sweeney, Between Sorry and Happy Endings: A New Paradigm of

Adoption, 2 Yale J L & Feminism 329, 340 (1990). See also Lewin, Strain on the Bonds of
Adoption at 4-3 (cited in note 77).
82 Nancy Ehrenreich also discusses this stigma, analogizing the lack of maternal instinct
imputed to single unmarried pregnant women to the devaluing of maternity for low-income
women and women of color. Ehrenreich, 41 DePaul L Rev at 1377-78 (cited in note 41). See
also Rothman, Recreating Motherhood at 132 (cited in note 65) (poor women who give up
children for adoption may feel forced into that "choice").
Lee Campbell, a mother who gave up her baby for adoption, later obtained her records
from the adoption agency. In one letter, her adoption worker said Ms. Campbell was extremely reluctant to give up her child, while in an official court paper, the worker concluded
that she had "no maternal feelings for the child." Lee Campbell, SurrenderingMy Baby, in
Janet Isaacs Ashford, ed, Birth Stories: The Experience Remembered 40, 41 (Crossing,

1984).
83 Sweeney, 2 Yale J L & Feminism at 354. See also Rothman, Recreating Motherhood
at 129 (cited in note 65) (discussing both the grief of the birth mother and the possibility of
"satisfaction" at helping to create joy).

One birth mother who hosts a radio show explained to her listeners that she had voluntarily given up her child for adoption in an effort to show that this choice could be socially
acceptable, and that "birthmoms should [not] be ashamed." Radio Show Host Announces
Baby's Up For Adoption, Morning Edition (National Public Radio) (Sep 9, 1993) (transcript available on NEXIS, NPR file).
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formed family. Many vestiges of this strategy still exist (p 72). The
child receives a new birth certificate, listing the adoptive mother as
the real mother, literally obliterating the existence of the birth
mother. Older people are discouraged from adopting newborns to
preserve a "normal" familial age."4 White parents are discouraged
from adopting black children1 5 Professor Bartholet condemns
these attempts to make an adoptive family look like the "natural"
family. Indeed, such strategies reinforce the primacy of the biological family, suggesting that families which look "different" are
"different."
Professor Bartholet challenges procedures designed to match
children with "appropriate" parents (p 78), preferring instead to
focus on the benefits to children being adopted (pp 177-78). Rather
than reinforcing the stigma of adoption for prospective parents by
making it a difficult and frustrating process, she suggests developing other strategies for overcoming the negative myths about adoption. Such strategies would include more education about adoption
issues, better statistical collection on who adopts and who places
children for adoption, and wider encouragement of adoption itself.
To alter current assumptions about appropriate families, she
speculates about research that would begin "with the assumption
that the norm and the ideal was the adoptive family," and which
would consider whether biological parents should be permitted to
raise their children (p 183). 81
Underlying the stigma of adoption are issues of sameness and
difference. Adoptive families are the same as non-adoptive families

81 This practice is also discussed in Shultz, 1990 Wis L Rev at 321 (cited in note 17).
81 There may be other reasons for this, such as an attempt to ensure that a child is
aware of, and raised in, her cultural heritage. See National Association of Black Social
Workers, Inc., Position Statement on TransracialAdoptions (Sep 1972), cited in Joyce A.
Ladner, Mixed Families: Adopting Across Racial Boundaries 75 (Anchor, 1977); Denise
Simmonds, Race and the Placement of Black Childrenfor Foster Care and Adoption (unpublished manuscript, 1992) (on file with U Chi L Rev) (exploring the benefits and drawbacks of transracial adoption). Transracial adoption can also be seen as furthering a system
established to provide babies for childless white couples. Zanita E. Fenton, In a World Not
Their Own: The Adoption of Black Children, 10 Harv Blackletter J 39, 51 (1993). For an
additional discussion of the history and effect of transracial adoption, see Rita J. Simon and
Howard Altstein, Adoption, Race, and Identity, from Infancy through Adolescence
(Praeger, 1992).
8 While research on the positive aspects of adoption is urgently needed, research on
the fitness of biological parents has historically been subject to bias based on race and class.
See note 15.
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for some purposes and different for others."' Part of the stigma
may result from their deviation from the normal family, just as
women's otherness has resulted from their differences from a male
norm. 8 Thinking about adoption in this manner might lead to an
attempt to ignore any differences between biological and adoptive
families, or to value the differences between the two types of families. Alternatively, as Professor Bartholet suggests, it could result
in changing the norm, shifting the emphasis from how families are
formed and on to families and children. This would require a respect for alternative family constructions, including adoptive and
gay families, that look different from the conventional middle-class
nuclear family. It might help change norms that penalize families
which do not conform-because of race or class-to this traditional
image. Efforts to change attitudes toward adoption should be part
of a more comprehensive agenda for reconceptualizing the family.
CONCLUSION

When Family Bonds was published, American culture seemed
obsessed with how to handle adoptions that fail because the biological parent(s) want the child returned. While coincidental, this
timing dramatizes the issues explored in the book and highlights
the need to "rethink the familiar" conceptions of families.8 9 Family Bonds begins the task of reconsidering adoption and is particularly timely given recent challenges to the rights of biological parents. For people who have never thought about adoption much, the
book provides a good introduction to some of the issues. And, for
people who are particularly concerned with rethinking family
bonds, the book sets out both useful and provocative proposals.
These proposals are incomplete, however, and primarily concern
the white middle-class adoptive mother and child, rather than the
experiences of others, including the birth mother and the biological
or adoptive father. Nonetheless, the book helps frame the appropriate parameters for further discussions about adoption through
its focus on the sameness and difference of biological and adoptive
families.
87 As a new George Washington University employee, I reviewed my health benefits and
found that a biological child is covered immediately from birth; for an adopted child, the
family must apply separately. (Plan on file with U Chi L Rev).
98 See Wendy W. Williams, Notes From A First Generation, 1989 U Chi Legal F 99;
Joan C. Williams, DeconstructingGender, 87 Mich L Rev 797, 800-02 (1989).
89 Milton C. Regan, Jr., Divorce Reform and the Legacy of Gender, 90 Mich L Rev
1453, 1494 (1992) (reviewing Martha Albertson Fineman, The Illusion of Equality: The
Rhetoric and Reality of Divorce Reform (Chicago, 1991)).

